## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AMARILLO DIVISION

ZACK ELDRED, JR.,

Petitioner,

V.

\$ 2:18-CV-40

LORIE DAVIS, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Correctional Institutions Division,

Respondent.

## <u>FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION</u> TO DISMISS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Before the Court is petitioner's March 2, 2018 pleading filed on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus form petition. The Court reviewed the claims in petitioner's submission and determined the claims actually concerned conditions of his confinement. Because such claims are appropriate in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, and not a § 2254 habeas corpus complaint, the Court, on March 5, 2018, ordered petitioner to respond and show cause why it should not redesignate this case as one brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioner's response was due on or before March 26, 2018; however, petitioner failed to respond as ordered.

On April 2, 2018, the Court entered a second Order and granted petitioner an additional fourteen days to show cause why his case should not be dismissed. Petitioner was admonished that failure to timely respond to the Court's Order may result in the dismissal of his federal habeas petition without further notice. As of this date, petitioner has not only failed to respond to the Court's orders, but also has not attempted to communicate with the Court in any way. The Court

the Court's direct orders.

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to dismiss an action *sua* 

has given petitioner ample opportunity to comply with its Orders, yet Petitioner has failed to follow

sponte for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with the federal rules or any court order.

Larson v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir. 1988). "This authority [under Rule 41(b)] flows

from the court's inherent power to control its docket and prevent undue delays in the disposition of

pending cases." Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link

v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386 (1962)). Petitioner has failed to comply with

direct orders of the Court, and such neglect warrants dismissal. Accordingly, Petitioner's habeas

application should be dismissed for failure to comply with this Court's April 2, 2018 Order.

**RECOMMENDATION** 

It is the RECOMMENDATION of the United States Magistrate Judge to the United States

District Judge that the federal habeas corpus application filed by petitioner ZACK ELDRED, JR.,

be DISMISSED.

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE** 

The United States District Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Findings, Conclusions and

Recommendation to each party by the most efficient means available.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

ENTERED April 25, 2018.

LEE ANN RENO

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

## \* NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT \*

Any party may object to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. In the event parties wish to object, they are hereby NOTIFIED that the deadline for filing objections is fourteen (14) days from the date of filing as indicated by the "entered" date directly above the signature line. Service is complete upon mailing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), or transmission by electronic means, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E). Any objections must be filed on or before the fourteenth (14th) day after this recommendation is filed as indicated by the "entered" date. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).

Any such objections shall be made in a written pleading entitled "Objections to the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation." Objecting parties shall file the written objections with the United States District Clerk and serve a copy of such objections on all other parties. A party's failure to timely file written objections shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings, legal conclusions, and recommendation set forth by the Magistrate Judge and accepted by the district court. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), as recognized in ACS Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 676 F.3d 512, 521 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988).